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I. INTRODUCTION

This article is about children, the decision by a custodial
parent with sole physical custody of a minor child or children to
relocate in another state following divorce, and Minnesota’s
response to the relocation request. It compares Minnesota’s
relocation doctrine with that of several other jurisdictions and
examines the competing views of experts on the impact relocation
has on children. The article discusses Minnesota’s relocation
history, its use of presumptions, and constitutional issues involving
relocation. It also touches upon other factors that impact
relocation such as gender politics and significant social changes
that have occurred during the last quarter century. Finally, the
article concludes with the suggestion that the impact of recent
social changes, doctrinal confusion among courts throughout the
nation, and disagreement among experts are so compelling that
Minnesota’s Legislature should review the relocation issue.
It is old news that the American family is having difficulty. Of
greatest concern are the children and the possible detrimental
impact recent social changes have had on them. These changes,
†
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including no-fault divorce and the lack of stigma attached to having
children outside of marriage, have generated huge numbers of
broken homes, driven both parents in large numbers to find work
at jobs outside the home, and encouraged single-motherhood.
Today’s family problems have attracted considerable attention
from legislatures, Congress, courts, politicians and others. Former
President Bill Clinton, for example, evinced concern over the
potential harmful impact that fatherless families have on children.
In a 1995 speech, Mr. Clinton said:
The single biggest social problem in our society may be
the growing absence of fathers from their children’s
homes, because it contributes to so many other social
problems . . . . Without a father to help guide, without a
father to care, without a father to teach boys to be men
1
and to teach girls to expect respect from men, it’s harder.
Statistical evidence supports Mr. Clinton’s concern; America is
2
increasingly becoming a fatherless society. Estimates suggest that
40% of all children in the United States resided in fatherless homes
in 1995, and “it is predicted that more than one-half of all children
in America will spend a ‘significant’ part of their childhood living
3
apart from their fathers.”
America is also increasingly becoming a nation where children
in two-parent families see less and less of their parents because
both parents must work outside the home to maintain a reasonable
standard of living. It is estimated that in 1998 only 68% of
4
American children lived with two parents and, of those parents,
5
about 31% were both working full-time outside the home. This is
6
up from 17% working outside the home in 1980.
Data gathered in 1997 regarding children living with single
mothers, often struggling to make ends meet, shows that these

1. President Bill Clinton, Speech at the University of Texas, Austin (Oct. 16,
1995), available at http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OP/html/
ut.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2001).
2. Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 1, 13 (2000).
3. Id.
4. Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental Responsibility Laws: Let the Punishment Fit
the Crime, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2000) (citing FEDERAL INTERAGENCY
FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA’S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL
INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 7, 14 (1999)).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1723-24.
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mothers are working outside the home about 41% of the time.
The emancipation of women and their movement toward full
equality has also impacted children as married women are
increasingly drawn into the outside-the-home workforce. Estimates
are that participation of married women in the labor force doubled
8
from 1969 to 1998. For married women with children less than
three years of age, the increase in the workforce over this period
9
“was almost threefold.” With both parents working outside the
home, children often have more daily contact with strangers than
their parents.
Divorced mothers with children and those with children born
out-of-wedlock share a grim statistical reality: they will find it
extremely difficult to avoid poverty. The one-parent family is six
10
times more likely to be poor than the two-parent family. In 1994,
it is estimated that 35% of children under the age of six living with
only their mother were at less than 50% of the poverty threshold;
11
however, only 4% of those living with both parents were that poor.
In that same year, 60% of children under the age of six living with
only their mothers were at or below the poverty line, whereas only
12
13% of those living with both parents fell into this category.
There is significant value to children if there are two parents
raising them. It is claimed, for example, that the “number of
parents living with a child is usually correlative to the amount and
13
quality of human and economic resources available to that child.”
It is also claimed that the family conditions with respect to divorce
and family cohesiveness are listed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as factors “known to affect the volume and type of
14
[juvenile] crime occurring from place to place.”
The law surrounding the issue of post-divorce relocation and
its impact on children is only one of many family problems society
is facing. However, because relocation may place a natural distance
7. Id. at 1724.
8. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women’s Cultural Caregiving and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 374 n.11 (2000).
9. Id. at n.12.
10. Wardle, supra note 2, at 11 (citing Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services
Program: Unaccountable, Political, Anti-Poor, Beyond Reform and Unnecessary, 17 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 321, 354-55 (1998)).
11. Id. at 11 n.61.
12. Id.
13. Graham, supra note 4, at 1724.
14. Id. (alteration in original).
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barrier between the child and the non-custodial parent, it is an
issue to be seriously weighed and resolved. Is Minnesota’s liberal
relocation doctrine “really” serving a child’s best interests? Or, is
the present state of the law in need of serious repair? While there
is wide-spread disagreement over the answers to those questions, all
agree that relocation is among the most difficult of the family
15
problems to resolve.
II. GENDER POLITICS AND A CHANGING SOCIETY
Gender politics have played a role in custody legislation for
decades.
For example, the nineteenth century paternal
preference, which awarded a minor child to the father absent a
16
showing he was unfit, was biased against women. This preference
was followed in most jurisdictions in the twentieth century by the
maternal, or tender years, preference, which awarded custody of a
child of tender years to its mother, absent a showing she was unfit.
This presumption was biased against men. At one time, the
Minnesota Legislature suggested that courts match the gender of
the minor child involved in a custody dispute to that of the
17
divorcing parent. Such statutes were biased against both men and
18
women.
In recent years, gender-driven political organizations have
been vocal in their claims of gender bias. One fathers’ rights
group, for example, claims that:
It is a well documented fact that fathers have a very
difficult time obtaining custody due to the pervasive
gender-bias that still exists in many parts of the Family
Court system. The sad fact is that custody is frequently
granted without any regard to who is actually the better
15. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM.
L.Q. 607, 628-30 (2001) (discussing the difficulties courts face in relocation cases).
16. See Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 189-90, 65 N.W 272, 273 (1895).
17. In Minnesota, it was thought that older boys were better raised by their
fathers; girls, especially infants, were believed better raised by their mothers. From
1969 to 1974, Minnesota courts were not prevented from considering a child’s age
and sex, and those of the prospective parent, when making custody decisions. In
1974, the Minnesota Legislature removed the language from the statute. Act of
March 28, 1974, ch. 330, § 2, 1974 Minn. Laws 555, 555-56 (1974) (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000)).
18. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 615-29 (1992) (discussing history and effect of gender
bias on child custody determinations).
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parent and what is truly best for the children.
The American Coalition for Fathers and Children declares
that it exists to create “a family law system, legislative system, and
public awareness which promotes equal rights for ALL parties
affected by divorce, and the breakup of a family or establishment of
20
paternity.”
Women’s political groups are just as vocal in expressing their
concerns—especially their rights, the fathers’ rights movement,
21
and biased legislation.
For example, the president of the
Michigan National Organization of Women expressed serious
concern over the national agenda of fathers’ rights groups:
Forced joint custody is . . . a top legislative priority of
fringe fathers’ rights groups nationwide. These groups
argue that courts are biased and sole custody awards to
mothers deny fathers their right to parent. They alleged
19. Separated Parenting Access and Resource Center, at http://
www.deltabravo.net/custody/index.shtml (last visited July 31, 2001). The Mission
Statement of the Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange, states in part:
While there are many highly visible interest groups advocating for the
very real plight of single mothers, few groups speak out for the
problems encountered by single fathers. As a result, society has come
to not only overlook the problems of single fathers, but to view single
fathers as the root of all evils visited upon the single mother.
The Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange, Mission Statement, at
http://dadsrights.org/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
20. American Coalition for Fathers & Children, ACFC Mission, at http://
www.acfc.org/missn.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001). A Minnesota organization,
The Men’s Defense Association, declares in its mission statement that it intends to
“assist individuals discriminated against in divorce and other gender matters
through education and referrals to local resources, especially attorneys.” Men’s
Defense Organization, Mission, at http://www.mensdefense.org/ (last modified
Apr. 11, 2001). Rev. Pat Robertson declared to a 1996 Christian Coalition rally:
And I watched little by little an unremitting assault by the left wing
forces, the ACLU, and the National Organization of Women, and
other radical groups who began . . . then to assault the institution of
marriage . . . . [S]tarting about 1970 . . . in almost every state this left
wing radical extremist coalition battered down the walls of intact
families and passed what were called no fault divorce laws.
James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 885 n.40 (Summer
2000).
21. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 15 (1995) (describing
how state policies are implemented to halt any trends that diverge from the
traditional nuclear family); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving The Family:
Challenging The Paradigm Of The Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505
(1998) (discussing judicial and legislative biases against “non-traditional family
units”).
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that, in most cases, mothers are awarded sole custody, with
fathers granted visitation rights. The men cite this as
22
proof of bias against fathers.
The National Organization of Women issued a nationwide
alert in 1996 warning of the increased power of fathers’ rights
23
groups.
As already touched upon earlier in this article, the nation and
Minnesota are undergoing enormous social changes, which are
having their greatest impact on the family structure. Recent figures
released by the Census Bureau show that of the nation’s 105
million households, only 24% consist of married couples with their
24
own children. With 25% of American homes occupied by singles
25
living alone, there are more single people than traditional
families. Furthermore, the number of single-parent households

22. Gloria Woods, “Father’s Rights” Groups: Beware Their Real Agenda, NAT’L
NOW TIMES, March 1997, available at http://www.now.org/nnt/03-97/father.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2001).
23. National Organization of Women, NOW Action Alert on “Fathers’ Rights”, at
http://www.now.org/organiza/conferen/1996/resoluti.html (last visited August
24, 2001). The Alert states:
WHEREAS the objectives of [fathers’ rights] groups are to increase
restrictions and limits on custodial parents’ rights and to decrease
child support obligations of non custodial parents by using the abuse
of power in order to control in the same fashion as do batterers; and
WHEREAS these groups are fulfilling their objectives by forming
political alliances with conservative Republican legislators and others
and by working for the adoption of legislation such as presumption of
joint custody, penalties for “false reporting” of domestic and child
abuse and mediation instead of court hearings; and . . .
WHEREAS many judges and attorneys are still biased against women
and fathers are awarded custody 70% of the time when they seek it per
the Association of Child Enforcement Support (ACES);
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National Organization for
Women (NOW) begin a national alert to inform members about these
“fathers’ rights” groups and their objectives through articles in the
National Now Times (NNT); and . . .
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that NOW encourage state and local
Chapters to conduct and coordinate divorce/custody court watch
projects to facilitate removal of biased judges . . . .
Id.
24. Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, America’s Families and Living Arrangements:
Population Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, June
2001, at 3, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (last
visited Sept. 16, 2001) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU REPORT].
25. Id.
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26

has grown by 18% over the last thirty years. Of this 18%, 14%
27
reflects the number of single-mother households. In two million
homes, up 4% in thirty years, fathers raise their children without a
28
29
mother. This number represents one household in fifty-two.
The census data for Minnesota is consistent with that of the
rest of the nation. The traditional family—a married couple with
their own children—accounts for a little more than a quarter of
30
While the raw number of married
Minnesota’s households.
families grew slightly in the 1990s, the growth was much faster for
other kinds of families. For example, the number of married
couples without children younger than eighteen grew by more than
31
32
10% and accounted for 28.5% of all Minnesota households. For
the first time, there are more householders living alone in
33
Minnesota—509,468 —than there are married couples with
children under eighteen.
Single parents with children younger than eighteen account
34
35
for over 11% of all American households, up from 6.8% in 1990.
Ten years ago, single mothers outnumbered single fathers by more
than four-to-one, however, they now outnumber single fathers by a
36
ratio of three-to-one.
The impact of gender-interested political groups will continue
to play a role in legislation. However, with the changing structure
of the family and as traditional parenting roles become blurred, it
may be that the gender of the particular parent will not be
considered as relevant as finding new ways for children to maintain

26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics for Minnesota: 2000,
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/tables/dp_mn_2000
.PDF [hereinafter Profile 2000].
31. In 2000, there were 540,630 married families without minor children in
Minnesota. Id. In 1990, there were only 482,527 such families. Profile of General
Demographic Characteristics for Minnesota: 1990, available at http://
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/tables/dp_mn_1990.PDF [hereinafter
Profile 1990].
32. Profile 2000, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Out of a total of 105 million households in the U.S., ten million were
single-mother families and two million were single-father families. CENSUS BUREAU
REPORT, supra note 24, at 3, 7.
35. Id.
36. Compare id. with Profile 1990, supra note 31.
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meaningful, close, regular relationships with both parents following
divorce.
III. MINNESOTA’S RELOCATION STANDARD
Minnesota has a fascinating relocation history which is closely
linked to several external factors. These factors include society’s
increased mobility, the emergence of no-fault divorce, greater
acceptance of divorce, increased employment opportunities for
women of all ages, and men and women remarrying in significant
numbers following divorce. Minnesota’s relocation story began
37
when the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Eberhart v. Eberhart.
The Eberharts were married in August 1915, a son was born to
them in 1916, and in 1918 Cora attempted to divorce Walter,
38
alleging cruel and inhuman treatment. The trial did not go well,
and Cora was denied a divorce. On the issue of the custody of their
youngster, the trial judge ruled that during the couple’s separation,
Cora should have custody from November 1 until May 1 each year,
39
and that Walter should have custody from May 1 to November 1.
40
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling.
At some point during the litigation, Cora fled Minnesota with
41
the minor child. The relocation issue arose during the second
round of litigation between Cora and Walter when Walter refused
to support either Cora or the minor child while they were outside
42
Minnesota.
Walter’s motion to relieve him of his support
43
obligation was granted by the trial judge, and Cora appealed. In
reviewing the matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial judge stating that unless Cora returned to Minnesota with the
child so Walter could exercise visitation, he no longer had a
44
support obligation.
At the time Eberhart was decided, most state courts were
concerned about losing personal jurisdiction over a party who left
37. 149 Minn. 192, 183 N.W. 140 (1921).
38. Id. at 193, 183 N.W. at 140.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 194, 183 N.W. at 141.
41. Eberhart v. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 68, 189 N.W. 592, 592 (1922).
42. Id. at 68, 189 N.W. at 593.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 68, 189 N.W. at 592 (“The plaintiff has taken the child from the
jurisdiction of the court. So long as she keeps him without the jurisdiction, the
defendant should be relieved from the payment of support money to accrue in the
future and that already accrued should not be enforced against him.”).
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the jurisdiction. Legal scholars were just inventing long-arm
statutes and debate over their application was wide-spread. Society
was becoming more mobile and Henry Ford’s Model “T” Ford
45
began making an impact, but highways, decent roads, and good
bridges were yet to be constructed, and modern air travel was
nonexistent. Divorces, of course, were rare. Few women held jobs
outside the home and only a handful occupied positions within a
profession such as law.
46
Eberhart was followed in 1940 by Anderson v. Anderson, where a
wife violated an express provision of the divorce decree prohibiting
47
her from taking the parties’ child outside Minnesota. The Eberhart
rule as to future installments of support money, however, was
distinguished and modified by the court in 1954 by Iverson v.
48
Iverson, where the wife had defeated the husband’s right of
49
visitation by removing the children to California. In Iverson, the
trial court granted the wife’s motion for a modification of the
original divorce decree expressly to permit her to live with the
children in California and to require the husband to pay for their
50
support in the future.
Eberhart was reconsidered by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
51
1956 in State of Illinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling. The outcome in
Shannon reflects, at least in part, the extent to which society had
changed in the three decades following Eberhart.
The parties in Shannon, Barbara Shannon and Kenneth
Sterling, divorced, and the trial court granted sole physical custody
of the minor children to Barbara while providing Kenneth with
52
reasonable visitation.
Following the divorce, Barbara left
53
Minnesota for Illinois without permission of the court or Kenneth.
54
Relying on Eberhart, Kenneth refused to provide any support.
45. Toyota Japan, Toyota Automobile Museum, at http://www.toyota.co.jp/
Museum/Tam/Car/ Ford2/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2001). Henry Ford was able to
mass produce the Model T and sell it for about $850. Id. He began assembly line
production of the model T in 1913. Id. Production of the Model T ended on May
27, 1927. Id.
46. 207 Minn. 338, 291 N.W. 508 (1940).
47. Id.
48. 243 Minn. 54, 66 N.W.2d 549 (1954).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 57, 66 N.W.2d at 551.
51. 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13 (1956).
52. Id. at 269, 80 N.W.2d at 16.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Barbara, while remaining in Illinois, initiated an action in
55
The trial judge,
Minnesota challenging Kenneth’s decision.
relying on Eberhart, dismissed Barbara’s support request on the
ground that she had deprived Kenneth of his visitation rights by
56
relocating without his consent or court approval.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court modified the
relocation views it had expressed in Eberhart. Consistent with
Eberhart, it held that a wife, who deprives her husband of his right
of visitation by relocating without court approval or without the
husband’s consent, cannot compel the husband to pay her any of
the support obligation that accrued during the period he was
57
denied visitation.
However, it also held that a trial judge
possessed the power to modify the divorce decree to permit the
children to remain outside Minnesota and compel support from
the father without mandating the return of the custodial parent to
58
Minnesota.
The Shannon court was influenced by the recently adopted
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), which
allowed interstate resolution of support issues. The court held that
despite the express terms of an original divorce decree, URESA
could be utilized to modify a husband’s visitation and authorize a
custodial wife to reside with the children outside the state and
59
compel the husband to pay for the future support of the children.
The ruling erased the harsh view taken in Eberhart.
The most significant change in Minnesota’s relocation law
occurred almost two decades ago when the Minnesota Supreme
60
Court decided Auge v. Auge. Since this decision, the court has not
directly revisited the issue.
The parties, Carol Ann (Auge) Berc and Frank Daniel Auge,
61
were married in 1974, separated in 1975, and divorced in 1979.
In 1975 a child, Frank Daniel Auge, Jr., was born to them. Frank
62
Junior suffered from physical disabilities.
When they divorced, Carol Ann received sole, physical custody
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 273, 80 N.W.2d at 18.
58. Id. at 274, 80 N.W.2d at 19.
59. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518.41-518.52 (1956).
60. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
61. Appellant’s Br. at 6, Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983) (No.
CX-82-1323).
62. Id.
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of Frank Junior, and Frank Senior was awarded visitation that
encompassed alternate weekends, one week during the child’s
63
Christmas vacation period, and four weeks during the summer.
64
In 1979 Carol Ann began living with Max Berc, Sr., who is
described in various court documents as “over sixty years old,”
possessing a net worth “in excess of three million dollars,” and
owning extensive business holdings in Hawaii with an annual
65
income in excess of $185,000. Two children were born to Max
and Carol Ann, and she was pregnant with a third when they were
66
married in Hawaii in January 1983.
In 1981, Carol Ann asked the Ramsey County, Minnesota
district court to allow her to relocate with Frank Junior to Hawaii
67
from December 5, 1981 to June 5, 1982. She stated that the move
68
was necessitated by the business activities of her live-in partner.
Frank Senior responded by moving for a court order giving
69
him sole physical custody of the child. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial judge granted Carol Ann permission to relocate
70
with Frank Junior to Hawaii for the requested six-month period.
The judge conditioned the order on Carol Ann providing Frank
Senior with funds for round-trip transportation for himself between
St. Paul and Honolulu and either suitable accommodations for
himself and the child for up to ten days or a sum equal to $45 per
71
day for up to ten days. Carol Ann was also ordered to provide
72
funds sufficient for a second round-trip air ticket. She and the
minor child left Minnesota in December for Hawaii.
In the summer of 1982, Carol Ann brought another removal
73
request to the Ramsey County, Minnesota district court. This time
she asked the court for permission to relocate with Frank Junior to
Hawaii from November through May. Frank Senior countered that
he was not able to afford to take the trips to Hawaii, which had
been contemplated by the 1981 order, and asserted that the new
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id. at 8.
65. App. to Appellant’s Br. at 51, Auge (No. CX-82-1323); Resp’t. Br. at 5,
Auge (No. CX-82-1323).
66. Resp’t. Br. at 5, Auge (No. CX-82-1323).
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Appellant’s Br. at 10, Auge (No. CX-82-1323).
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. App. to Appellant’s Br. at 13, Auge (No. CX-82-1323).
73. Appellant’s Br. at 14, Auge (No. CX-82-1323).
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request was an attempt to interfere with his visitation rights. He
75
again asked that he receive sole physical custody of Frank Junior.
Without conducting a hearing, the Referee appointed to hear
the dispute ruled that Carol Ann’s request was “contrary to the best
76
interests of the child.” The referee also found “no deep business
necessity” for Max Berc to take Frank Junior and his mother to
Hawaii. The district court affirmed the Referee’s ruling and Carol
Ann sought an expedited hearing with the Minnesota Supreme
77
78
Court via a Writ of Mandamus.
The petition was denied,
79
however, and the normal appeal process took over.
With the mandamus petition dismissed, and a decision on the
appeal months away, the trial judge granted Frank Senior’s request
80
that he be awarded temporary physical custody of Frank Junior.
Carol Ann, Max and the minor children, except Frank Junior, left
81
Minnesota for Hawaii in November 1982.
In the summer of 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued
its ruling and established a new set of legal principles to apply in
relocation disputes. These principles remain intact to the present.
The court was obviously upset over the trial judge’s decision
changing sole, physical custody from Carol Ann to Frank Senior
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. It held that
because denying a custodial parent’s permission to relocate to
another state effectuates a change in custody, a trial judge cannot
issue such an order without first conducting a full evidentiary
82
hearing where witnesses may be cross-examined.
The court then weighed in heavily on the side of supporting a
custodial parent’s relocation effort. It held that Minnesota Statutes
section 518.18(d), which on its face is silent on the matter,
contained an implicit presumption that relocation must be
permitted, subject only to the non-custodial parent’s ability to

74. Id.
75. Resp’t Br. at 10, Auge (No. CX-82-1323).
76. Appellant’s Br. at 15, Auge (No. CX-82-1323); Resp’t Br. at 10, Auge (No.
CX-82-1323).
77. Id.
78. Appellant’s Br. at 15, Auge (No. CX-82-1323). The writ was denied
October 27, 1982. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 15-16.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396; see also Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.
1985).
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83

establish that relocation is not in the child’s best interests. The
implicit presumption theory sprang from discussions the court
84
found in a student law review note, articles by Goldstein, Frend,
85
86
Solnit and Mnookin, and decisions from South Dakota, New
87
88
Jersey, and a handful of other jurisdictions. The court observed
that New Jersey’s relocation statute, which at the time was similar to
89
Minnesota’s, “allows removal only upon ‘cause shown.’”
This
phrase was viewed, however, as not including the whole range of
issues going to primary custody, but rather the probability of
90
assuring reasonable visitation to the non-custodial parent.
Auge directed trial judges to presume that a relocation request
91
was in the best interests of the child, and if opposed by the noncustodian for reasons of health, education or religion, they were to
defer to the custodial parent’s decisions unless, after an evidentiary
hearing, it was determined that “failure to limit the custodial
parent’s authority will endanger the child’s health or
92
development.”
83. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396. Minnesota Statutes § 518.18(d) stated that in
modification proceedings,
the court shall retain the custodian established by the prior order
unless: . . . (iii) The child’s present environment endangers his
physical or emotional health or impairs his emotional development
and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.
MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1982).
84. Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to
Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 361 n.124 (1981).
85. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8-11
(1979); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 226, 265 (1975).
86. In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808, 810 (S.D. 1981).
87. D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
88. The court cited the following as examples: In re Marriage of Siklossy, 409
N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 826
(Iowa 1978); Hale v. Hale, 429 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). It also
observed that other courts took a more middle-of-the-road approach, establishing
no presumption but allowing removal if it is in the best interests of the child and
giving as examples: Hutchins v. Hutchins, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978); Jafari v. Jafari, 284 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1979).
89. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:2-2 (West 1976)).
90. Id. at 396.
91. Id. at 399; see also Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn. 1983).
92. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399-400 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.176, subd. 1
(1982)). See, e.g., Knott v. Knott, 418 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(allowing removal to California of two children not clearly erroneous where
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The court incorporated its relocation principles into
application of Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d), with the consequence that a
non-custodial parent could not prevent relocation, absent a prima
facie showing that relocation would harm the child’s physical or
emotional health. Incorporating the statute provided additional
93
support for custodial parents considering relocation.
The court also accepted the “different family unit theory,” first
espoused by the New Jersey Supreme Court in D’Onofrio v.
94
D’Onofrio:
The children, after the parents’ divorce or separation,
belong to a different family unit than they did when the
parents lived together. The new family unit consists only
of the children and the custodial parent, and what is
advantageous to that unit as a whole, to each of its
members individually and to the way they relate to each
other and function together is obviously in the best
interests of the children. It is in the context of what is
best for that family unit that the precise nature and terms
of visitation and changes in visitation by the non-custodial
95
parent must be considered.
The court in Auge rationalized its new relocation principles on
three bases: First, they obviated de novo consideration of which
parent is the better custodian, where the issue had earlier been

noncustodian failed to establish a prima facie case that move was not in the best
interest of the two children sought to be removed); Lucas v. Lucas, 389 N.W.2d
744, 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating non-custodial parent must establish by
preponderance of evidence that move is not in best interest of child); Corwin v.
Corwin, 366 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding custodial parent
may remove child from state absent proof that the move would endanger child’s
best interest); Benson v. Benson, 346 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(allowing motion by custodial parent to be granted unless the party opposing the
motion establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the
best interest of the child ); Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (requiring that permission be given to the custodial parent to remove a
child from the state unless the non-custodial parent establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the best interests of the
child or is sought for the purpose of interfering with the non-custodial parent’s
visitation rights).
93. MINN. STAT. § 518.176, subd. 1; see also Lucas v. Lucas, 389 N.W.2d 744,
747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that because respondent did not rebut
answers to questions raised at the hearing, the trial court maintained the burden
of finding reliable evidence of the best interests of the children before it finally
approved the move).
94. 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
95. Id. at 29-30.
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96

resolved. Second, they maintained the child in the family unit to
which, in the eyes of the court, the child “currently belongs,” and
minimizes judicial interference with decisions affecting that family
97
unit. Finally, they placed the decision regarding a minor child
98
“with the person best able to consider the child’s needs.”
The court also observed that, in the past, relocation requests
were sometimes denied because of the potential loss of jurisdiction
99
over custody issues. However, with the adoption of the Uniform
100
Child Custody Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
101
of 1980, it felt that these historic concerns were no longer
significant. The Auge doctrine has been followed in numerous
102
decisions and remains the law in Minnesota today.
IV. COMPARING MINNESOTA’S RELOCATION STANDARD WITH OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
When

Minnesota’s

post-divorce

relocation

standard

is

96. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating children’s interests are to be considered in the context of what is best for
the family unit made up of the children and the custodial parent).
99. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399.
100. MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1982).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. V 1981).
102. See, e.g., Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 1999);
Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996); Ayers v. Ayers, 508
N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 1993); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 213 (Minn.
1988); In re Welfare of J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986); In re Welfare of
J.W., 391 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1986); Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 25
(Minn. 1985); Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Minn. 1983); State ex rel
Gunderson v. Preuss, 336 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn. 1983); In re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d
43, 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Ballard v. Wold, 486 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); Spaeth v. Warren, 478 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Crippen, J., dissenting)
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Geiger v. Geiger, 470 N.W.2d 704, 705 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 396 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Haasken v.
Haasken, 396 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In re Welfare of B.E.N., 392
N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Lucas v. Lucas, 389 N.W.2d 744, 746
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); Sydnes v. Sydnes, 388 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Vogt v. Vogt, 385
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Johnson v. Smith, 374 N.W.2d 317, 321
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Kellen v. Kellen, 367 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Otava v. Otava, 374 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Adam v. Adam,
358 N.W.2d 487, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Benson v. Benson, 346 N.W.2d 196,
198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Tieso v. Hansen, 349 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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compared to that found in other jurisdictions, it is apparent that
Minnesota has created a standard that is among the most liberal in
103
the nation. As noted earlier, this liberal standard was created by
the Minnesota Supreme Court out of a custody modification
provision that some had viewed as favoring the non-custodial
104
parent. Minnesota is not alone in its liberal, pro-relocation view,
however, and has been joined by Wisconsin, South Dakota,
California and several other jurisdictions. Moreover, a recent
survey of relocation decisions in America indicates that the “vast
majority” of courts are permitting post-divorce custodial parent
105
relocation.
Minnesota and the jurisdictions favoring liberal relocation
combine a few well-established facts with a handful of assumptions
103. Minnesota will grant an evidentiary hearing in a relocation dispute only if
the affidavits submitted by the non-custodial parent, taken as true, establish a
prima facie case. Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn.
1981). To establish a prima facie case, the moving party must demonstrate a
change of circumstance in the child’s environment that endangers the child’s
physical or emotional health or emotional development, that a modification
would be in the child’s best interests, and that the advantage of a change will
outweigh any harm likely caused by the change. MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (1998);
see Abbott v. Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
104. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393. The court noted that “[t]his statute most
frequently comes into play upon a non-custodial parent’s motion that custody be
transferred to him or her, rather than in the context of a motion for removal from
the state.” Id. at 396-97. The court found the underlying considerations of both
issues similar and viewed denying the custodial parent permission to relocate as a
conflict often resulting in a modification of custody. Id. at 395-96. In Auge, while
not excluding other grounds to deny relocation, the court noted only one means
by which a non-custodial parent could meet this burden: the non-custodial parent
could show that the purpose of the move is to frustrate the non-custodial parent’s
visitation rights. Id. This view has resulted in a very relaxed standard.
105. Elrod & Spector, supra note 15, at 629 (citing Thomas v. Thomas, 705
N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. 2000) (considering relocation in awarding the mother primary
physical custody); see also In Ex parte Monroe, 727 So.2d 104, 106 (Ala. 1999)
(finding evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s modification of a custody
order to place the child with the father if the mother moved to Michigan);
Pearson v. Pearson, 5 P.3d 239, 243-44 (Alaska 2000) (allowing mother to move to
Pennsylvania and modifying father’s visitation); Walkowiak v. Walkowiak, 749
So.2d 855, 859 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no error for court to make mother
primary domiciliary parent and allow her to relocate to her home state);
Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 599-600 (Neb. 1999) (concluding
career opportunities sufficient to allow the mother to move); Chen v. Heller, 759
A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); In re Henion, 699 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding preponderance of evidence showed relocation in
best interest of children); In re Marriage of Pape, 989 P.2d 1120 (Wash. 1999), as
corrected, (Feb. 15, 2000). Contra Stark v. Anderson, 748 So.2d 838, 838 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999) (ruling evidence sufficient to change custody to father).
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about the future improvement in the life of the custodial parent to
support their position. The facts relied upon include recognition
that society is increasingly mobile, that there is a high incidence of
divorce and remarriage, and both parents often move following
106
divorce. The assumption the jurisdictions make is that relocation
will result in a better life and greater happiness for the custodian,
107
and that this will positively affect the minor child.
These jurisdictions also see liberal relocation as an important
108
equalizing factor in post-divorce life.
They reason that because
there are no legal relocation constraints on a non-custodial parent,
it would be unfair to impose relocation restrictions on the custodial
parent, even if the new location is geographically distant from the
109
child’s residence.
They believe that the custodial parent should
be entitled to the same opportunity for a better life as that
provided the non-custodial parent. For these jurisdictions, a liberal
110
relocation standard helps accomplish this goal.
The liberal relocation jurisdictions adopt the principle that a
custodial parent’s relocation request is presumptively in the child’s
best interests. The presumption also provides the custodial parent
with a significant amount of security by permitting relocation while
retaining custody. The presumption is linked to an assumption
that it will help promote stability in the custodial parent’s
relationship with the minor child.
The liberal relocation jurisdictions also support the use of
presumptions on pragmatic grounds.
They believe that
presumptions help prevent future litigation problems by reducing
custody relocation disputes, usually simplify the issues in a dispute,
and provide the custodial parent with confidence in knowing how a
111
court will most likely decide a relocation issue.
Furthermore,
106. It is claimed by some that this mode of behavior is “coming to represent
the norm.” Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move:
Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30
FAM. L.Q. 305, 310 (1996).
107. See, e.g., Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that “[t]here is a presumption that a request by the custodial parent to
remove the child to another state is in the best interests of the child . . . to
encourage continuity and stability in post-dissolution family relationships.”).
108. See, e.g., D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Ann M. Driscoll, In Search of a Standard: Resolving the Relocation Problem in
New York, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 187 (1997).
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presumptions are viewed as useful in reducing unchecked judicial
112
discretion.
Under Minnesota’s liberal standard, the custodial parent is
protected by both a favorable presumption and a “harm” barrier
that the noncustodian must overcome if the move is to be
prevented. Absent a showing that relocation would psychologically
or physically harm a child, a custodial parent may relocate to
another state. Although the meaning of “harm” is unclear,
relocation would probably be denied where a child with a serious
medical condition was relocating to an area where the condition
cannot be adequately treated.
The more conservative relocation jurisdictions tend to
emphasize that the child’s interests are separate from those of the
parents. They utilize presumptions favoring the non-custodial
parent and place the burden of proving that the move is in a child’s
113
best interests on the parent seeking to relocate.
The conservative jurisdictions assume that the distance
between the child and the non-custodial parent may be a
significant detrimental factor in continuing the child’s healthy
development. They link distance and irregular visits created by
distance to their belief that everything reasonably possible should
be done to preserve and foster both parents’ relationships with the
child.
A few jurisdictions, such as Maryland, seem to be moving
114
toward a neutral view of relocation.
The wide variety of national standards suggests that relocation
decisions may turn more on the doctrinal view of a particular
115
jurisdiction than the best interests of a minor child.
The
following analysis from a handful of representative jurisdictions
112. See Costa v. Costa, 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1983).
113. See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 636 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that although the custodial parent should show an advantage to the
move, it is only one of several factors which the court may consider); Staab v.
Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) (placing burden on custodial
parent to show “some real advantage” to relocation); Ramos v. Ramos, 697 So. 2d
280, 283 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling burden on custodial parent to prove that “the
move is in the child’s best interest”).
114. See Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and
Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 293 (1996)
(noting that Maryland courts have classified the new relocation statute as neutral,
although it appears to favor the non-custodial parent).
115. See Mandy S. Cohen, A Toss of the Dice . . . The Gamble With Post DivorceRelocation Laws, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 136-49 (1989).
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further illustrates the national conflict over relocation standards.
South Dakota has a liberal relocation standard similar to
Minnesota’s; it places minimal relocation restrictions on the
116
custodial parent. In Fortin v. Fortin, the court ruled that a noncustodial parent does not have a right to prior notice of relocation
and possesses no opportunity to be heard in opposition to the
relocation, unless the noncustodian initiates an action for a
117
The burden of proof is placed on the nonrestraining order.
custodial parent to show how the relocation is inconsistent with the
118
child’s best interests.
Wisconsin has a liberal relocation standard and employs
statutory presumptions favoring relocation that generally dictate
119
the outcome of relocation disputes. Wisconsin also requires that
116. 500 N.W.2d 229, 232 (S.D. 1993).
117. The South Dakota statute reads as follows: “A parent entitled to the
custody of a child has the right to change his residence, subject to the power of
the circuit court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or welfare
of the child.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (Michie 1984).
118. See Jennifer L. Linngren, Note, The Feuding Fortins: South Dakota Adopts a
Presumption in Favor of the Custodial Parent’s Right to Remove a Minor Child from the
Jurisdiction in Fortin v. Fortin, 39 S.D. L. REV. 661, 662 (1994).
119. WIS. STAT. § 767.327(3)(a)2.a (2000) provides:
There is a rebuttable presumption that continuing the current
allocation of decision making under a legal custody order or
continuing the child’s physical placement with the parent with whom
the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best interest of
the child. This presumption may be overcome by a showing that the
move or removal is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the
child.
Id. Section 767.327 provides, as material here:
Moving the child’s residence within or outside the state.
(3) STANDARDS FOR MODIFICATION OR PROHIBITION IF MOVE
OR REMOVAL CONTESTED.
(a) 1. Except as provided under par. (b), if the parent proposing the
move or removal has sole custody or joint legal custody of the child
and the child resides with that parent for the greater period of time,
the parent objecting to the move or removal may file a petition,
motion or order to show cause for modification of the legal custody or
physical placement order affecting the child. The court may modify the
legal custody or physical placement order if, after considering the
factors under sub. (5), the court finds all of the following:
a. The modification is in the best interest of the child.
b. The move or removal will result in a substantial change of
circumstances since the entry of the last order affecting legal custody
or the last order substantially affecting physical placement.
2. With respect to sub.1.:
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the non-custodial parent, objecting to a relocation request, petition
for a change in custody, and then overcome the presumption that
the move is in the best interests of the child. In Kerkvliet v.
120
Kerkvliet,
relocation was allowed even though the custodial
mother’s motive for moving with the children was deemed “feeble
121
and insensitive.”
Wisconsin courts view the relocation issue as
involving not whether to allow the move, but rather whether to
transfer custody to the non-custodial parent in the event that the
122
move actually took place.
North Dakota is a conservative jurisdiction, and its relocation
law markedly differs from that of Minnesota, Wisconsin, or South
Dakota. In North Dakota, if a non-custodial parent receives
123
visitation rights in a divorce decree, a custodial parent “may not
change the residence of the child to another state except upon
order of the court or with the consent of the non-custodial parent.”
The purpose of this standard is said to protect the non-custodial
parent’s visitation rights where the custodial parent wants to move
124
out of the state.
North Dakota places the burden on the
custodial parent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
125
relocation is “in the best interests of the child,” and emphasizes

a. There is a rebuttable presumption that continuing the current
allocation of decision making under a legal custody order or
continuing the child’s physical placement with the parent with whom
the child resides for the greater period of time is in the best interest of
the child. This presumption may be overcome by a showing that the
move or removal is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the
child.
b. A change in the economic circumstances or marital status of either
party is not sufficient to meet the standards for modification under
that subdivision.
Id. § 767.327(3).
120. 480 N.W.2d 823 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
121. Id. at 829.
122. Id. at 826.
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07 (1999); see also Henz v. Henz, 624 N.W.2d
694, 696 (N.D. 2001).
124. Olson v. Olson, 611 N.W.2d 892, 894 (N.D. 2000); Hanson v. Hanson, 567
N.W.2d 216, 218 (N.D. 1997).
125. See Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1997); see also Tishmack v.
Tishmack, 611 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 2000); Keller v. Keller, 584 N.W.2d 509, 512
(N.D. 1998).
The court has specified four factors for consideration in
determining if a requested change in a child’s residence to another state is in the
child’s best interest: (1) the prospective advantages of the move in improving the
custodial parent’s and child’s quality of life; (2) the integrity of the custodial
parent’s motive for relocation, considering whether it is to defeat or deter
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that visitation is not merely a privilege of the non-custodial parent,
but a right of the children. Visitation is presumed to be in the
126
children’s best interests.
Connecticut does not align itself with Minnesota’s liberal
relocation standard or with states such as North Dakota; rather, it
attempts to adhere to a middle-of-the-road relocation view. In
127
Ireland v. Ireland, the court held that when a custodial parent
seeks permission to relocate, the initial burden is on that parent to
demonstrate that the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and the
proposed relocation is reasonable in light of that purpose. Once
the custodial parent has made a prima facie showing, the burden
then shifts to the non-custodial parent to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the relocation is not in the
best interests of the child. The court reasoned that if it required
the custodial parent to forego potential benefits of relocation—
such as educational, employment or marriage opportunities—it
would result in denying the minor child the correlative benefits of
such opportunities such as increased financial or emotional
128
stability of the family unit.
Colorado’s relocation view is similar to that of Connecticut. In
129
In re Marriage of Francis, the Colorado Supreme Court held that in
removal cases, “the custodial parent must present a prima facie case

visitation by the non-custodial parent; (3) the integrity of the non-custodial
parent’s motives for opposing the move; (4) the potential negative impact on the
relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child, including whether
there is a realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis
for preserving and fostering the non-custodial parent’s relationship with the child
if relocation is allowed, and the likelihood that each parent will comply with such
alternate visitation. “No one factor dominates, and a factor that has minor impact
in one case may be the dominant factor in another.” State ex rel. Melling v. Ness,
592 N.W.2d 565, 569 (N.D. 1999).
126. Tibor v. Tibor, 623 N.W.2d 12, 16 (N.D. 2001); see Hendrickson v.
Hendrickson, 603 N.W.2d 896, 902 (N.D. 2000); Stout, 560 N.W.2d at 911.
127. 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998).
128. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgham, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(stating “a request [to relocate] would likely indirectly benefit the child by making
the custodian a happier, better adjusted parent than would be the case if the
custodian’s freedom of movement was more restrained.”); Cooper v. Cooper, 491
A.2d 606, 612 (N.J. 1984) (concluding “[b]ecause the best interests of a child are
so interwoven with the well-being of the custodial parent, the determination of the
child’s best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be taken into
account”); Long v. Long, 381 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Wis. 1986) (saying the trial court
should not have “ignored the impact of the custodial [parent]’s well-being on the
children”).
129. 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996).
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showing that there is a sensible reason for the move.”
Once a
prima facie case has been established, it is presumed that the best
interests of the child are to remain with the custodial parent and
the burden shifts to the non-custodial parent to demonstrate that
the move is not in the best interests of the child.
For many years, New York was considered among the most
restrictive relocation jurisdictions in the nation. It followed a
procedure that required the non-custodial parent to prove that
relocation deprived the non-custodial parent of meaningful
“access.” Once that burden was met, the custodial parent then had
to show “exceptional circumstances” supporting the move.
131
However, in Tropea v. Tropea,
it replaced the “exceptional
circumstance” test with a detailed inquiry as to what is in the child’s
best interest. It held that the outcome of relocation requests
should be determined by consideration of all relevant facts, with
predominant emphasis placed on what outcome is most likely to
132
serve the “best interests” of the child. This approach resembles a
133
de novo custody determination.
While Tropea failed to establish
130. Id. at 784-85.
131. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
132. A trial judge faced with a relocation request in New York is to conduct a
detailed inquiry into a number of factors including the following:
(1) the quality of the alternate home environments; (2) a comparison
of the parental guidance which would be provided to the child if
relocation were granted and if relocation were denied; (3) the
financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child; (4)
the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s emotional and
intellectual development; (5) the desires of the child with appropriate
weight given to the child’s young age and maturity; (6) the quantitative
and qualitative impact upon the child of losing existing contacts with
the Father and the community or with the Mother, Step-Father and
siblings; (7) the quantitative and qualitative impact upon the noncustodial parent of losing existing contacts with the child; (8) the
feasibility of devising a visitation schedule or other arrangement that
will enable the non-custodial parent to maintain a meaningful parentchild relationship; (9) the difficulty, advantage and disadvantage that
the child will experience in residing and adapting to a remarkably new
and different place and culture; (10) the economic necessity or lack
thereof for wanting to relocate; (11) the existence of good faith in
requesting and opposing the relocation and whether Respondent’s
reasons for moving are valid and sound; (12) Respondent’s attempts to
obtain a “fresh start”; and (13) the continued or exacerbated hostility
between Petitioner and Respondent if relocation were permitted and if
relocation were denied.
Lazarevic v. Fogelquist, 668 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
133. For a detailed analysis of Tropea v. Tropea, see Edwin J. (Ted) Terry et al.,
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which party should bear the burden of proof as to the child’s best
interests, lower courts of that state have indicated that the burden
134
is on the custodial parent.
California adopted a liberal relocation standard in In re
135
Marriage of Burgess. There, the court held that a custodial parent
seeking to relocate bears no burden of establishing that the move is
136
necessary.
Rather, the custodial parent has the right to change
the residence of the child, except in the case of a move detrimental
to the child or a move intended to deprive the non-custodial parent
of contact. The custodial parent need not show that relocation is
essential or expedient, and the trial court must take into account
the presumption that the custodial parent has a right to move with
her child, provided that the move would not be prejudicial to the
137
child’s rights or welfare.
The South Carolina Supreme Court established a presumption
138
against relocation in McAlister v. Patterson.
However, that state’s
appellate court has apparently not applied the presumption to any
139
relocation case since it was established in 1982.
The message sent by the variety of inconsistent relocation
standards throughout the nation is this: whether relocation is
allowed may depend on whether a state has created a presumption,
and then, to whom the presumption is applied. The standard
selected, however, may depend on which of the various political
interest groups have been the most successful in lobbying the
legislature; or, it may turn on the particular political views of a
majority of a state’s judiciary.
Relocation: Moving Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 983, 987
(2000).
134. See, e.g., Burnham v. Basta, 659 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(placing burden on custodial parent).
135. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (involving mother with sole custody who wanted
to make forty-mile move on the basis of employment).
136. Id. at 476, 482. Prior to Burgess, California courts had required a custodial
parent seeking to relocate to show that the move was in the child’s best interests.
See In re Marriage of Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737, 740 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20,
1995). In In re Marriage of Carlson, the California Court of Appeal stated that the
“precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the trial court
order advanced the best interests of the child.” In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
137. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478.
138. 299 S.E.2d 322 (S.C. 1982).
139. Caroline Ritchie Heil, Relocation Cases as Change in Custody Proceedings:
“Judicial Blackmail” or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 885, 886, 898
(2000).
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V. THE EXPERTS DISAGREE
The central issue in the national relocation debate focuses on
the answer to these questions: Is frequent and continuing contact
with both parents in a child’s best interests? Or, is a child’s need
for stability and need to remain with the custodial parent more
important than maintaining frequent and continuing contact with
the non-custodial parent on a weekly or bi-weekly basis? The
answers provided by experts studying the relocation issue, which
may have once appeared reasonably clear and without major
disagreement, are now hotly debated. Because the experts can’t
agree, jurisdictions are faced with making hard choices on less than
reliable scientific evidence.
Minnesota’s struggle with relocation experts is apparent upon
140
examination of decisions such as Silbaugh v. Silbaugh.
In this
dispute, Meredith Silbaugh, who was awarded sole physical custody
of the couple’s children following divorce, notified her ex-husband
141
John that she wished to relocate to Arizona with their children.
John opposed the move, and the couple sought resolution through
142
When mediation failed, Meredith petitioned the
mediation.
143
court to authorize relocation.
John requested an evidentiary
hearing or, in the alternative, modification of the judgment making
him the child’s primary custodian should Meredith leave
144
Minnesota.
In support of his motion to obtain an evidentiary hearing,
which required a prima facie showing of endangerment, John
145
attached a number of affidavits to his moving papers.
They
included sworn statements by his brother and sister, whose children
regularly played with John and Meredith’s children, his pastor, a
friend, and an acquaintance of both parties, who related an
146
instance of alcohol use by Meredith’s fiancé. In John’s affidavit,
147
he claimed that Meredith and her fiancé abused alcohol.
John retained Dr. Charles Cutler, a licensed psychologist, to
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

543 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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aid him in assessing the impact Meredith’s move would have on the
148
Dr. Cutler had prepared a report based on interviews
children.
with the children, and John attached the report to his moving
149
papers.
In his report, Dr. Cutler stated that the children had
mixed feelings about the move and had indicated to him that they
preferred to spend more time with John. In Dr. Cutler’s opinion,
relocating the children would be harmful to their emotional well150
being and development and would not be in their best interests.
In terms of legal precedent in support of his motion for a
151
hearing, John relied on a 1984 decision, Benson v. Benson.
In response to John’s motion, Meredith submitted an affidavit
in support of the move. She stated that she had a career
opportunity in Arizona that had the potential for a better lifestyle
152
for herself and the children. She also stated that her fiancé had
153
purchased a home in Arizona and a lake cabin in Minnesota.
Meredith proposed a new visitation schedule that included return
visits to Minnesota during the summer months to accommodate
154
extended visitation for the children with John.
As legal
precedent in support of denying John an evidentiary hearing,
155
Meredith relied on a 1991 decision, Geiger v. Geiger.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 346 N.W.2d 196, 198-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing the district
court’s finding that the appellant had failed to make a prima facie showing against
removal).
The appellate court found serious questions surrounding the
respondent’s impending marriage, the children’s new home, and the lack of
necessary medical care for one of the children. Id.
152. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 640.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 470 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), pet. for rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 1, 1991) (affirming the district court’s ruling that the appellant had failed to
make a prima facie case against removal). The court held that, aside from the
natural adjustments and difficulties of moving, the appellant had “cited no specific
facts to show how the move would be against the children’s best interests.” Id.; see
Knott v. Knott, 418 N.W.2d 505, 507, 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the
district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing despite affidavits by appellant and
two doctors stating that the child’s asthma would be temporarily exacerbated by
the move; the district court had reasoned that adequate medical care could be
arranged in the child’s new state); Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the absence of any “indication of poor
performance in school, increased illness, [or] reports from psychologists, teachers,
or friends” was fatal to appellant’s attempt to make a prima facie showing against
removal).
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The trial judge reviewed the various documents and ruled that
John had failed to establish a prima facie case of endangerment.
156
Meredith’s request to relocate was granted. In his ruling, the trial
judge disregarded Dr. Cutler’s opinion regarding the impact the
move would have on the children. The judge found that Dr.
Cutler’s report was inconsistent with the “customary and ethical
practice” of custody evaluations and contrary to the couple’s
157
divorce decree. John appealed.
In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge Minnesota Court of
158
Appeals’ panel reversed the trial judge.
They found that John’s
affidavits established a prima facie showing of endangerment. A
hearing where he could more fully present his evidence, including
the testimony of Dr. Cutler regarding the impact relocation would
159
The court found inter alia
have on the children, was ordered.
that the trial judge had improperly weighed Dr. Cutler’s report
160
when it considered other outside contrary evidence.
Meredith petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court and asked
161
that it review the Court of Appeals’ decision. Meredith’s petition
for review was granted.
162
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. It held that
the trial judge did not err in rejecting Dr. Cutler’s opinion,
reasoning that the rejection was within the trial judge’s
163
discretion.
Further commenting on the report, the court stated
that because it was produced without the knowledge or consent of
Meredith, it was “arguably inconsistent with the provisions of the
164
judgment and decree.”
The court also said that while Dr.
Cutler’s report portrayed strong and loving relationships between
the Silbaugh children and John and his new wife, it failed to
provide information about potential problems in Meredith’s

156. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 640.
157. Id.
158. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, No. CO-94-1739, 1994 WL 705384 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 20, 1994). This opinion is designated as unpublished and may not be cited
except as provided by Minn. St. Sec. 480A.08(3).
159. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 640.
160. Id. at 640-41.
161. Id. at 641.
162. Id. at 642.
163. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d at 641 (relying on Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d
88 (Minn.1983)).
164. Id.
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165

home.
The court observed the report could not do this because
166
The court
Dr. Cutler did not have any contact with Meredith.
suggested that Dr. Cutler’s report described the kind of stress and
anxiety inherent for children in any move to a new locality and
diminution of contact with one parent, which the court indicated is
167
insufficient to trigger a change in custody.
The court said that any geographic change inevitably creates
some anxiety for children, however, evidence of the disruption
typically associated with such a move is not sufficient to overcome
the Auge presumption that removal is in the best interests of the
168
It noted that the “bare allegations” of alcohol abuse
children.
were not sufficient to establish “endangerment to the child’s
169
physical or emotional health,” and concluded that the allegation
that Meredith’s move was intended to interfere with John’s
170
visitation rights was not supported by John’s affidavits.
Silbaugh and other decisions have cemented Minnesota’s
liberal relocation standard into the everyday practice of family
lawyers. When the custodial parent seeks to move the child or
children to a different state, visitation arrangements such as longer
summer or holiday visits and regular telephone and mail contact
171
are viewed as appropriate alternatives.
Shifting from the local to the national scene, the leading
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Cf. In re Marriage of Sheley, 895 P.2d 850, 856 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995),
overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash.
1997); Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in
a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. LAW 791, 799 (1992).
168. Silbaugh, 542 N.W.2d at 642.
169. Id.; see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988).
170. Silbaugh, 542 N.W.2d at 642.
171. See, e.g., Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (concluding extended summer visitation and other opportunities for
visitation were reasonable and adequate ways to maintain parent-child
relationship); Meyer v. Meyer, 346 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(arranging alternative reasonable visitation schedule including regular telephone
calls and extended summer and holiday visits). In Auge v. Auge, the court
observed:
[T]he alternative of uninterrupted visits of a week or more in duration
several times a year, where the [non-custodial parent] is in constant
and exclusive parental contact with the children and has to plan and
provide for them on a daily basis, may well serve the [parent-child]
relationship better than the typical weekly visit which involves little if
any exercise of real [parental] responsibility.
334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983).
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proponent of liberal relocation is Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein.
Her
influential studies have concluded that custody should not be
173
She has
changed unless it is necessary to protect the child.
asserted that the cumulative body of social science research does
not support the presumption that frequent and continuing access
174
to both parents lies at the core of the child’s best interest.
Dr. Wallenstein argues the “centrality of the well-functioning
custodial parent-child relationship as the protective factor during
175
the post-divorce years.”
She says that “when courts intervene in
ways that disrupt the child’s relationship with the custodial parent,
serious psychological harm may occur to the child as well as to the
176
Courts and commentators have generally accepted the
parent.”
177
reliability of her research.
Recently, Dr. Wallenstein’s research has come under critical
scrutiny. In an article published in 2000, Dr. Richard A. Warshak
states that “critical reading of over seventy-five studies in the social
science literature, including Wallerstein’s earlier reports, generally
supports a policy of encouraging both parents to remain in close

172. Judith S. Wallerstein, Ph.D., founded the Center for the Family in
Transition in Marin County, California in 1980 and served as its executive director
from 1980 until 1993. She has researched and written extensively on the impact of
divorce on children. See, e.g., JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 297, 301 (1989);
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (setting forth Dr. Wallerstein’s theories);
Joan Berlin Kelly & Judith S. Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of
the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 20 (1976); Judith S. Wallerstein &
Joan Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Adolescent Experience, in 3 THE
CHILD IN HIS FAMILY: CHILDREN AT PSYCHIATRIC RISK 479 (1974); Judith S.
Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child
in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 256 (1976); Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan
Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 600 (1975); Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long Term Effects of
Divorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 349
(1991).
173. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 106, at 310, 318.
174. Id. at 311.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Calif. 1966). Professor
Judith S. Wallerstein submitted an amicus curiae brief to the California Supreme
Court in this relocation case. Id. at 483 n.11. The amicus brief later appeared in
slightly revised form under the title, “To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and
Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce.”
Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 106, at 310.
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178

proximity to their children.”
He contends that Professor
Wallenstein has ignored the “broad consensus of professional
opinion, based on a large body of evidence, that children normally
develop close attachments to both parents, and that they do best
when they have the opportunity to establish and maintain such
179
attachments.” He claims that in earlier research, Dr. Wallerstein,
recognized that the child’s need for continuity of emotional bonds
meant the need for continuity of relations with both parents, and is
puzzled because she now interprets “the same research results as
supporting the view that courts should foster continuity in the
child’s relationship with the mother but not with the father
180
[where] the scientific literature does not justify it.”
He also
questions Dr. Wallerstein’s continued reliance on old research,
conducted at a time when children saw relatively little of their
fathers after divorce, where recent studies “document a change
since the 1970s and early 1980s with greater involvement of
181
divorced fathers with their children.”
Dr. Warshak asserts that Dr. Wallerstein has excluded from her
research “many studies which repeatedly demonstrated a link
between frequency of children’s contact with divorced fathers and
children’s behavior, emotional health, satisfaction with custodial
182
arrangements, and academic achievement.”
He attacks Dr.
Wallerstein’s assumption that the relocation will be rewarding for
the relocating parent, suggesting that courts should consider the
very real possibility that the relocation may not bring the
anticipated benefits:
The new relationship may fail. Graduate school may not
be what the parent expected. The new job could be shortlived. Relationships with extended family can become
strained. And the children’s difficulties adjusting to the
move and separation from their other parent might cast a
178. Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation
Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (2000). Dr. Warshak is a clinical,
consulting, and research psychologist in private practice and Clinical Professor at
the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, Texas.
179. Id. at 85, n.9 (citing RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION
(1992); HENRY B. BILLER, FATHERS AND FAMILIES: PATERNAL FACTORS IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT (1993); THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (Michel E.
Lamb ed., 1997)); see also ROSS D. PARKE, FATHERS (1981) (for reviews of this
literature).
180. Warshak, supra note 178, at 86.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 90.
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pall on the parent’s satisfaction with the new
circumstances.
In the event that the relocation
disappoints the custodial parent, the children could
experience the diminished parenting Wallerstein refers
to, without the protective buffering effect of frequent
183
contact with the non-custodial parent.
Other critics have attacked Dr. Wallerstein’s research as
anecdotal, and without scientific sampling or rigorous “doubleblind” methodologies to ensure correction for any researcher
184
bias. Moreover, they contend that her subjects are not necessarily
typical because they come from predominantly white, upper
middle class and are well educated, which raises questions about
185
application of her findings to other groups.
It is apparent that the impact on a child’s development where
the custodial parent is relocating is open to serious scientific
disagreement. Consequently, where a child has a close and loving
relationship with both parents, courts should hesitate to
automatically permit either parent to “win” the child because of an
unsupported supposition in favor of either parent based on social
science data. The paramount consideration in a child custody
decision is the child’s best interests, not those of the child’s
parents. Given the absence of reliable scientific support for either
parent, Minnesota’s recent decision to encourage couples to
develop a parenting plan that can mandate the use of the “best
interests” test where relocation becomes an issue, is clearly a step in
186
the right direction.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL—MINNESOTA’S
PERSPECTIVE
Historically, custodial parents could not relocate outside
Minnesota with a minor child without the consent of the custodial
187
Courts feared that once the custodian
parent or a court order.
was outside the state that they would lose jurisdiction to provide the
183. Id. at 99.
184. See http://www.divorceinfo.com/judithwallerstein.htm#Limitations (last
visited August 31, 2001).
185. Id.
186. MINN. STAT. § 518.1705 (2000) (parenting plan can direct the best
interest standard to govern relocation if both parties are represented by counsel or
were fully informed, the agreement was voluntary and the parents were aware of its
implications).
187. See, e.g., Eberhart v. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 189 N.W. 592 (1922).
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non-custodial parent with access to the child. The question of the
constitutionality of such a procedure was not discussed in the early
188
decisions.
During the last quarter century, however, the constitutional
issues surrounding relocation have been discussed in several
189
190
articles and raised in various decisions.
For example, in
191
Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a
state may not impose a burden on a relocating parent that
192
unconstitutionally impairs the relocating parent’s right to travel.
The court observed, “[t]his right is so deeply ingrained in
193
American law that it certainly needs no elaboration by the court.”
194
In Watt v. Watt,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a trial judge’s modification of a divorce decree
that changed custody due to the intrastate relocation of the
195
custodial parent.
At the time of the couple’s divorce, the trial
court had imposed a restriction of an automatic change of custody
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Blair Hoffman, Note, Restrictions on a Parent’s Right to Travel in
Child Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1973);
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 67 (1995-96); Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to
Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625 (1985-86); Tabitha
Sample & Teresa Reiger, Relocation Standards and Constitutional Considerations, 10 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS 229 (1998); Edward Sivin, Note, Residence
Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J.
341 (1981); Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Post-Divorce Children: Relocation,
the Constitution and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1985).
190. See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418 (1981) (describing the right to
travel as a privilege of national citizenship); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
629 (1969) (stating that although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the
right to travel is a fundamental concept firmly established and repeatedly
recognized), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (recognizing fundamental right to travel
using Commerce Clause); Staab v. Hurst, 868 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Ark. Ct. App.
1994); Day v. Day, 711 So.2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas,
481 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1985); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M.
1991) (finding a presumption against removal of the child by the custodial parent
unconstitutionally impairs the custodial parent’s right to travel); Pitt v. Olds, 511
S.E.2d 60 (S.C. 1999).
191. 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 305 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (“[A]ll citizens [have the right
to] be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
movement.”)).
194. 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999).
195. Id. at 616.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001

31

07_FORMAT.OLIPHANT.10.12.01.DOC

754

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 10
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/1/2001 6:01 PM

[Vol. 28:2

if the mother moved out of the area; a year after the divorce, she
196
The
petitioned to relocate so she could pursue her education.
trial court found the automatic change of custody language
improper; however, it awarded custody to the father based on the
197
children’s best interests.
The Wyoming Supreme Court stated
that the trial court’s action amounted to impermissible
198
infringement of the mother’s right to travel. It ruled that there is
a fundamental right to intrastate travel protected by the
199
unenumerated rights clause of the Wyoming Constitution.
Other courts have voiced concerns about orders imposing
restrictions on the custodial parent without discussing their
constitutional implications. For example, the Iowa Court of
200
Appeals in In Re Thielges, declared that “[w]e strongly disapprove .
. . of custody provisions, whether stipulated by the parties or
mandated by the court, that predetermine what future
201
circumstances will warrant a future modification.”
Early Minnesota family law decisions reflected the
jurisdictional concerns shared with the other state courts in the
202
nation. For example, in Eberhart v. Eberhart, when the custodial
parent left Minnesota with the minor child, the non-custodial
parent halted child support payments. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that so long as the custodial parent remained outside
Minnesota with the child, the non-custodial parent was relieved of
any support obligation. No constitutional question was raised or
discussed.
A quarter of a century ago, Minnesota indirectly addressed the
203
constitutionality of relocation in Ryan v. Ryan.
In that dispute,
the custodial parent of a seven-year-old wanted to relocate to
204
She had accepted employment with the federal
Ohio.

196. Id. at 610.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 623 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). In Thielges, the mother wanted to
move with three children from Iowa to North Dakota, and the decree had
provided that a move by either party from the children’s school district “shall
constitute a substantial change in circumstances regarding modification of custody
of the minor children.” Id. at 234.
201. Id. at 237.
202. 153 Minn. 66, 189 N.W. 592 (1922).
203. 300 Minn. 244, 219 N.W.2d 912 (1974), reh’g denied July 26, 1974.
204. Id. at 245, 219 N.W.2d at 914.
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government, and began work with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
205
and Dangerous Drugs in Cincinnati. When her former husband
rejected her relocation request, she sought judicial authorization.
Following a hearing, her request to relocate was rejected along
with her former husband’s motion to have custody transferred to
206
him. In a memorandum accompanying the order, the trial judge
stated that the custodian’s “true reason for accepting employment
207
Given the financial
in Ohio was for personal self-fulfillment.”
circumstances of the parties and particularly those of plaintiff, the
trial judge found no substantial improvement in the financial
situation could be shown by the acceptance of the federal
208
employment.
However, the trial judge left custody with the
custodian because of the child’s strong preference, apparently
209
The
indicated to the court during in an in camera proceeding.
210
custodial parent appealed.
In her argument to the Minnesota Supreme Court in Ryan, the
custodial parent asserted that Minnesota Statute § 518.175, which
forbade relocation without permission of the non-custodial parent
211
or the court, unconstitutionally infringed on her right to travel.
The court rejected her claim, reasoning that the decision to bar
removal did not involve placing any sanctions against her. The
court said that the statute imposed no conditions for the court to
consider and that the sanctions imposed by the trial judge were
independent of the statute. It reasoned that the sanction against
205. Id.
206. Id. at 246, 219 N.W.2d at 914.
207. Id. at 246-247, 219 N.W.2d at 914.
208. Id. at 247, 219 N.W.2d at 914.
209. Trial courts were reminded that when considering motions for removal of
a child outside the jurisdiction of the state or for support of children who have
been removed outside the jurisdiction of the state, they must consider, in the
exercise of their discretion, the legislative mandates included in MINN. STAT. §
518.175, subds. 3-4, which provided as follows:
Subd. 3. The custodial parent shall not move the residence of the
child to another state except upon order of the court or with the
consent of the non-custodial parent, when the non-custodial parent
has been given visitation rights by the decree. Subd. 4. Proof of an
unwarranted denial of or interference with duly established visitation
may constitute contempt of court and may be sufficient cause for
reversal of custody.
210. Ryan, 300 Minn. at 247, 219 N.W.2d at 914.
211. The custodial parent relied on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). Ryan, 300 Minn. at 251-52, 219 N.W.2d at 917.
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relocating was not brought into play by operation of the statute but
by the exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Therefore, the court
found that no constitutional issue was before it.
The constitutionality of relocation was more directly
considered by Minnesota’s intermediate court of appeals in
212
LaChapelle v. Mitten. The dispute was not, however, one involving
a custodial parent seeking to relocate in a post-divorce dispute.
Rather it involved the biological mother of the child, the mother’s
former lesbian lover, and the male whose sperm had been used to
213
inseminate the biological mother.
The biological mother, Denise Mitten, gave birth to a child as
a result of artificial insemination from sperm donated by Mark
214
LaChapelle.
Mitten and her partner, Valerie Ohanian, had
agreed with LaChapelle and his partner as to custody and visitation
215
When Mitten and Ohanian severed LaChapelle’s
of the child.
visitation with the child, LaChapelle began
paternity
216
proceedings. Later, when Mitten and Ohanian terminated their
relationship, the parties commenced various proceedings to
217
determine custody and visitation rights. By this time, Mitten and
218
the minor child had moved to Michigan.
After an extended hearing, the trial judge granted Mitten sole
physical custody on the condition that she and the child leave
219
Michigan and take up residence in Minnesota.
Mitten appealed alleging that the trial judge abused his
discretion in conditioning sole physical custody on her return to
220
Minnesota.
She claimed the order violated her constitutional
221
rights of travel, privacy and equal protection.
A three-judge court of appeals panel held that conditioning
sole physical custody on Mitten returning with the infant to
Minnesota from Michigan did not violate her constitutional right of
222
travel, because the move was in the child’s best interests.
The
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev. denied May 16, 2000.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 163.
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panel reasoned that once the child was returned to Minnesota, it
could maintain a relationship with all of the parties who had played
a role in its life: the custodial parent (her biological mother), her
mother’s former lesbian partner as her “emotional parent,” and the
223
sperm donor, her biological father.
The court of appeals conceded that conditioning sole physical
custody on the custodian’s return to Minnesota raised fundamental
questions regarding her right to travel, privacy, and equal
224
protection under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.
It also agreed that the right to travel is inherent in the concept of
our country as a federal union and a fundamental constitutional
225
It recognized that the
right under the federal constitution.
nature of the disadvantage or hardship involved was important to
226
the level of review of any restriction on the right to travel. In this
dispute, the hardship imposed on the custodial parent was
characterized as the loss of sole physical custody of her daughter if
227
she failed to return to Minnesota.
The court of appeals also recognized that requiring the
custodian’s return to Minnesota implicates the fundamental right
to raise one’s child, and it applied the strict scrutiny standard of
228
review. The strict scrutiny test could be met only by a showing of
a compelling state interest, which it said were the best interests of
229
the minor child.
In its analysis, the court relied in part on a recent ruling from
230
the Montana Supreme Court, In re Custody of D.M.G. This dispute
involved an unmarried couple that had lived together and had had
231
Two years following the birth of the children, the
two children.
relationship broke down, and the mother moved to Oregon with
232
The biological father challenged the relocation
the children.
and the trial judge awarded the parties joint custody and provided
that the mother would have primary physical custody once she

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 164.
See id. at 163.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
951 P.2d 1377 (Mont. 1998).
Id. at 1379.
Id.
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233

returned to Montana.
If she did not relocate, custody of the
234
children would be rotated every two years.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused
his discretion by effectively requiring the mother to relocate or lose
custody in the absence of sufficient proof of a compelling nature to
235
interfere with her constitutional right to travel.
However, it
asserted that the mother’s constitutional right of interstate travel is
qualified by the special obligations of custody, the state’s interest in
protecting the best interests of the children, and by the competing
236
interests of the non-custodial parent.
The Montana court also
held that furtherance of the best interests of children may
constitute a compelling state interest worthy of reasonable
interference with a parent’s right to travel, but the parent
requesting the travel restriction must provide sufficient proof that a
restriction is in the best interests of the child, although in this case,
237
the father had not done so.
In LaChapelle, the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed that
the trial judge did not restrict the custodian parent’s right to
remain in Michigan; the judge only required that the minor child
238
to be returned to Minnesota. It reasoned that any burden placed
on the custodial parent’s right to travel arose from her desire to
239
remain the minor child’s sole physical custodian.
The court also agreed that parents enjoy a general freedom

233. Id.
234. Id. at 1380.
235. Id. The court also held that the trial judge should have applied the
statutory presumption that custody should be awarded to primary care giver, who
was the custodial mother. Id.
236. Id. at 1383.
237. Id. See also Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773, 780 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)
(citing with approval the district court decision) (“Providing and assuring the
maximum opportunities for parental love, guidance, support and companionship
is a compelling state interest that . . . warrants reasonable interference with the
constitutional right of travel.”); Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 100 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986) (holding grant of custody to mother on condition she return to Indiana
does not impose burden on right to travel, because (1) she remains free to go
where she chooses; (2) it is only the children who must be returned to Indiana;
and (3) the law has few objectives more compelling than protecting the interests
of children); Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (“[The
custodial parent’s] right to travel or even to establish residence elsewhere is
limited only by her desire to retain her status as the custodial parent.”).
238. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev.
denied May 16, 2000.
239. Id.
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240

from governmental intrusion in child-rearing decisions
and,
although not absolute, a constitutional right to familial privacy.
Where there is an allegation of interference by the state with a
protected right of privacy, the court balances the interest in the
privacy against the state’s need to intrude on that privacy. Here,
Minnesota’s interest in protecting the child’s best interests were
considered sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion into the
custodial parent’s privacy in her familial relationship with the
241
minor child.
Mitten had also argued that the order requiring her to return
to Minnesota unfairly obligated her to move to a place she does not
want to live for the convenience of the child’s father and one other
242
important adult in the child’s life. Such an order, she contended,
offends the equal protection clauses of the Minnesota and United
243
The court of appeals also rejected this
States Constitutions.
argument. It reasoned that the order did not require the custodial
parent to move her home at all; it simply required that the minor
child be brought back to Minnesota because this was in the child’s
244
best interests.
LaChapelle did not, of course, involve relocation following
divorce or application of the Auge v. Auge presumption. However,
the constitutional issues raised in LaChapelle would certainly appear
to implicate post-divorce relocation requests.
It would be
somewhat unusual if there were two relocation standards: one for
divorced custodial parents and another for custodians of children
born out of wedlock.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the last quarter century, society in Minnesota has changed

240. Id. (citing In re Santoro, 578 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d
on other grounds, 594 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1999); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 164-65 (citing Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836-37 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1983) as a rejection of the mother’s argument that a residency restriction in
the custody decree violated equal protection because a similar restriction was not
placed on the father, because the best-interests-of-the-child standard applies to
both parents).
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245

significantly. It is increasingly mobile, home to large numbers of
dual-career couples with hundreds of day care centers caring for
thousands of children. Women are attracted to work outside the
home in growing numbers and are gaining unprecedented
prominence within business and within the legal and medical
professions. Increasingly, fathers are taking a more active role in
their children’s lives. Past assumptions regarding the role of men
and women play in raising children may no longer be viable.
Courts, legislatures, and experts, struggling with the question
of relocation following divorce, have not reached a consensus on
the consequences of relocation on a child’s future development.
All agree that a relocation decision must be in a child’s best
interests; however, they disagree over the outcome of a relocation
dispute.
Jurisdictions outside Minnesota vary on whether to begin a
relocation request with a presumption favoring the custodial or
non-custodial parent. Proponents favoring the custodial parent
contend that a custodial parent presumption, similar to that used
in Minnesota, is in the child’s best interests. Those favoring the
non-custodial parent contend that maintaining the status quo,
absent a showing of compelling circumstances, is in the child’s best
interests.
Everyone recognizes that there is no easy answer to the
question of allowing relocation when a custodial parent is offered a
better-paying, career-enhancing job in a new location and the noncustodial parent, who has actively participated in a child’s life,
refuses to surrender overnight visits, regular weekend visits,
dropping by the child’s soccer game and attending parent-teacher
conferences.
Relocation law in Minnesota has become somewhat confusing.
Some of the confusion exists because the Minnesota Supreme
Court has indicated it will not enforce stipulations between parents
regarding the appropriate standard to apply when relocation is
246
request. However, this ruling appears to have been overruled by
the new Parenting Plan legislation that makes it clear that a couple
can agree on the legal standard to apply where relocation becomes

245. See Theresa A. Peterson, Note, The State of Child Custody in Minnesota: Why
Minnesota Should Enact the Parenting Plan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577,
1580-81 (1999).
246. Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 1999).
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247

an issue in the future.
The LaChapelle decision, although decided by Minnesota’s
intermediate appellate court, raises troubling constitutional
questions about current practice under Minn. Stat. §
248
518.18(d)(iv).
247. Minnesota Statutes provide the following:
Subd. 7. Moving the Child to Another State. Parents may agree, but
the court must not require, that in a parenting plan the factors in
section 518.17 or 257.025, as applicable, will govern a decision
concerning removal of a child’s residence from this state, provided
that:
(1) both parents were represented by counsel when the parenting plan
was approved; or
(2) the court found the parents were fully informed, the agreement
was voluntary, and the parents were aware of its implications.
Subd. 8. Allocation of Certain Expenses. (a) Parents creating a
parenting plan are subject to the requirements of the child support
guidelines under section 518.551.
(b) Parents may include in the parenting plan an allocation of
expenses for the child. The allocation is an enforceable contract
between the parents.
Subd. 9. Modification of Parenting Plans. (a) Parents may modify the
schedule of the time each parent spends with the child or the decisionmaking provisions of a parenting plan by agreement. To be
enforceable, modifications must be confirmed by court order. A
motion to modify decision-making provisions or the time each parent
spends with the child may be made only within the time limits provided
by section 518.18.
(b) The parties may agree, but the court must not require them, to
apply the best interests standard in section 518.17 or 257.025, as
applicable, for deciding a motion for modification that would change
the child’s primary residence, provided that:
(1) both parties were represented by counsel when the parenting plan
was approved; or
(2) the court found the parties were fully informed, the agreement was
voluntary, and the parties were aware of its implications.
(c) If the parties do not agree to apply the best interests standard,
section 518.18, paragraph (d), applies.
MINN. STAT. § 518.1705, subds. 7, 8, 9 (2000). One of the most significant changes
in the last couple of years is the increase in the number of states that require a
parent who seeks custody to file a “parenting plan.” See, e.g., Robert L. Gottsfield,
Relocating Andy: Remaining with the Nurturer as Guiding Principle; Impact of Relocation
Statute; How to Win a Removal Case, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y 10, 11 (Jan. 2000) (discussing
Arizona’s Parenting Plan).
248. Minnesota Statutes § 518.18(d)(iv) provides that custody will not be
modified unless: “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical
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It would appear that the time is ripe for the Minnesota
Legislature to revisit the entire issue of relocation and to the extent
possible, neutralize the current state of the law. A separate neutral
statute would make all relocation decisions consistent with the
Parenting Plan legislation promulgated in 2000. It would remove
political influence to the extent possible and best protect the
interests of children.
There are, of course, many relocation models to examine.
New York’s de novo approach, Maryland’s neutral effort, and drafts
249
of Model Acts may all be helpful. It is time for a new and up-todate legislative evaluation of post-divorce relocation. Minnesota’s
children deserve no less.

or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of
a change to the child.” MINN. STAT. §518.18(d)(iv) (2000).
249. Janet Leach Richards, Children’s Rights v. Parents’ Rights: A Proposed Solution
to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. REV. 245, 277 n.176 (1999) (citing
the Proposed Model Relocation Act (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
(1997)), copies of which are available from the AAML office: American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers, 150 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2040, Chicago, Illinois
60601, phone: 312-263-6477).
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